Iraqi democracy, two years later

[switchfoot]

WASHINGTON TIMES

Iraqi democracy, two years later
Austin Bay
Friday, May 30, 2008
U.S. and Iraqi troops are seen patrolling Mosul, the northern Iraqi city considered to be the last urban base of al Qaeda in Iraq.

Considering the violent threats, fractured politics and bitter history it confronts, Iraq's democratic government has accomplished much in two short years.

For a variety of reasons - most self-serving, a few disgustingly dishonest - American and European debate over Iraq all too often loses or conveniently discards three pertinent facts regarding the Iraq of May 2008: It has survived in very complex conditions, it is the product of democratic elections, and it has several hard-fought but significant accomplishments in its two bloody years of existence.

Its birth was hard, and frankly, its birth isn't over. The Iraqi general elections of December 2005 - which laid the foundations for the new government - reflected not only the deep and fractured politics of post-despotism Iraq but provided a representative sample of the entire Middle East's fractious ethnic and sectarian divisions.

For at least seven millennia, Mesopotamia has been precious terrain, and that long history involves multiple births, collisions and deaths. The present sectarian and ethnic mosaic is a product of that rich history. Mesopotamia has seen several determinative births, including the Agricultural Revolution and, if you credit Abraham of Ur, the birth of Western monotheism. Empires have expanded and shrunk to ruins, with Babylon (its bricks lie south of Baghdad) a premier example.

Many Mesopotamian collisions remain unresolved - not just between Shia and Sunni Muslims (a product in part of the battle of Karbala in A.D. 680), but between Semitic Arabs and Iranians. And don't forget Arabs encountering Turks, with Kurds in the buffer.

Vicious tyranny put a murderous, exploitative clamp on these people - in Saddam's case an adventurous tyranny willing to invade Iran and Kuwait and wage 12 years of sanctions war with the United Nations. Various terrorist groups promise various utopias (in al Qaeda's case, a global "sectarian cleansing").

The December 2005 elections continued the difficult process of mitigating these collisions and divisions, a process arguably begun when the United Nations-established post-Desert Storm no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq. Post-election attempts to form a government repeatedly failed. A mid-March 2006 goal for establishing a government came and went. The February 2006 terror attack that destroyed Samarra's Golden Mosque was timed to thwart any parliamentary compromise.

Yet Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki never buckled. In late May 2006, the fractious parliament approved a Cabinet - another step in the birth process of democratic government in Mesopotamia.

Mr. al-Maliki faced repeated attempt to oust him - attempts using terror and violence but also parliamentary means, which are, paradoxically, a positive sign.

The Iraqi government hasn't met American expectations, which are largely shaped by the U.S. presidential election cycle, but dismissing its achievements is arrogant and ignorant. It is also myopic, given the century-shaping regional and global implications of Iraqi success.

The Federalism Law, de-Ba'athification reforms and amnesty laws and the Provincial Powers Act are major legislation, especially when crafted, debated and passed amidst sensational terrorist attacks designed to shake the confidence of Iraqis and keep international media focused on conflict instead of maturing compromise.

Reconciliation and consolidation have not been achieved, though Iraqis clearly know a lot more about reconciliation in Iraq than Americans. The December 2006 execution of Saddam, marred though it was, removed the personality from the tyrant's cult of the personality.

Saddam's "former regime elements" believed if they hung on that Saddam would return to power. The dictator's open and fair trial also served as a forum to express the people's shared suffering.

Operation Charge of the Knights, begun in southern Iraq in March, followed by Lion's Roar in the Mosul area, are security operations that have clearly served the larger political purposes of strengthening national support for the federal government. Kurds and Sunni Arabs expressed overwhelming support for Charge of the Knights attacks on Shia gangs. The Mosul offensive was designed to destroy al Qaeda cells that have increasingly focused their violence on Iraqi Sunnis who have joined the political process.

Success over the last two years has been incremental -democracies tend to work that way. There are signs, however that a democratic foundation is being built for a more secure, productive and free Iraqi future.

Austin Bay is a nationally syndicated columnist.

[Judge]

Good info. thanks.

[ZenMachine]

Some things that don't pass muster in this article. First is the reference to the battle of Karbala. It was not a battle between semitic Arab and Iranians. It was a battle between the grandson of Mohammed, Husayn ibn Ali, and the forces of Yazid, the caliph. The battle was over who should be caliph. The followers of Husayn ibn Ali were slaughtered and those who follow them came to be Shia Muslims and the followers of the caliph Sunni. Shia did not spread to Persia until after that time.

Second, the so-called de-baathification program was not a major piece of legislation but rather a huge mistake. Many people in Iraq that were instrumental to the country but not necessarily loyal to Saddam were in the Baath party. To be in any public position such as the better army units, the national government, police force, a teacher, doctor required that one be a member of the party. In the same way that Patton kept Nazis on in their previous posts after the fall of Germany, on the grounds that they were the only ones capable of effectively running the country, we should have sought to keep some Baath party members in government, especially the police and some army units.

The book State of Denial by Woodward chronicles the missed opportunities during the early days in Iraq. Gen. Garner had the chance to keep 100,000 non-conscript Iraqi troops as units of the new government for the bargain price of $20 million. This would obviously have been a buffer against the chaos that ensued in the loss of security after the fall of Baghdad. These troops had knowledge of how to maintain security in Iraq and instead of using them we decided to start fresh with Shia majority police and army units that still have not proven to be very effective. Of course many of those very same Sunni troops we could have kept on the payroll joined the Sunni insurgency no longer being employed by the Iraqi government.

Of course those absolutely loyal to Saddam, his family, and very high ranking members of rep. guard units needed to be taken out, but there were many other Sunnis that were not from Saddam's al-tikriti tribe that would have been willing to work for us. Ironically, this is basically what Petraeus has attempted to do with the "awakening" councils. So I would argue to that de-baathification was a resounding failure than a major piece of legislation as the author claims.

I am not sure if we could have prevented the slide into chaos had we kept some Sunni baath party members in the government, but we would have had a much better chance of doing so...

[switchfoot]

Originally Posted by ZenMachine

Some things that don't pass muster in this article. First is the reference to the battle of Karbala. It was not a battle between semitic Arab and Iranians.

The article did not say that it was. Here is the sixth paragraph, broken down into separate lines, but otherwise unchanged:

Many Mesopotamian collisions remain unresolved -
not just between Shia and Sunni Muslims (a product in part of the battle of Karbala in A.D. 680),

but between Semitic Arabs and Iranians.

And don't forget Arabs encountering Turks, with Kurds in the buffer.

This paragraph refers to three separate "collisions", and the one you mention says "in part"

It was a battle between the grandson of Mohammed, Husayn ibn Ali, and the forces of Yazid, the caliph. The battle was over who should be caliph.

Which is the argument between Sunni and Shiite arabs today, is it not?

The followers of Husayn ibn Ali were slaughtered and those who follow them came to be Shia Muslims and the followers of the caliph Sunni. Shia did not spread to Persia until after that time.



Second, the so-called de-baathification program was not a major piece of legislation but rather a huge mistake.

It was both. A major piece of legislation, and it was a mistake, if your definition of 'de-ba'athification' is to be used. You aparently believe they were completely purged from these positions. They were not. What was removed was the monopoly on these positions. Some had to go to allow other parties access to some positions. Just like, according to you, SOME nazis were allowed to remain on some posts.

Many people in Iraq that were instrumental to the country but not necessarily loyal to Saddam were in the Baath party. To be in any public position such as the better army units, the national government, police force, a teacher, doctor required that one be a member of the party. In the same way that Patton kept Nazis on in their previous posts after the fall of Germany, on the grounds that they were the only ones capable of effectively running the country, we should have sought to keep some Baath party members in government, especially the police and some army units.

The book State of Denial by Woodward chronicles the missed opportunities during the early days in Iraq. Gen. Garner had the chance to keep 100,000 non-conscript Iraqi troops as units of the new government for the bargain price of $20 million. This would obviously have been a buffer against the chaos that ensued in the loss of security after the fall of Baghdad. These troops had knowledge of how to maintain security in Iraq and instead of using them we decided to start fresh with Shia majority police and army units that still have not proven to be very effective. Of course many of those very same Sunni troops we could have kept on the payroll joined the Sunni insurgency no longer being employed by the Iraqi government.

Well stated. Hindsight is like that. Next time we invade Iraq, we should keep that in mind. I'm not sure what part of the OP you are refering to though...

Of course those absolutely loyal to Saddam, his family, and very high ranking members of rep. guard units needed to be taken out, but there were many other Sunnis that were not from Saddam's al-tikriti tribe that would have been willing to work for us. Ironically, this is basically what Petraeus has attempted to do with the "awakening" councils. So I would argue to that de-baathification was a resounding failure than a major piece of legislation as the author claims.

Again, it was both. The two are not mutually exclusive. And hindsight, again, makes us all experts at invading countries.

I am not sure if we could have prevented the slide into chaos had we kept some Sunni baath party members in the government, but we would have had a much better chance of doing so...

I would like someone to tell me what is so "chaotic" about Iraq, for anyone except terrorists. The twelfth paragraph of the OP addresses, I believe, you are convinced there is "chaos" in Iraq. Here it is:

The Federalism Law, de-Ba'athification reforms and amnesty laws and the Provincial Powers Act are major legislation, especially when crafted, debated and passed amidst sensational terrorist attacks designed to shake the confidence of Iraqis and keep international media focused on conflict instead of maturing compromise.

ZenMachine, did you even read the article?

[KEVWYO]

Originally Posted by switchfoot

Considering the violent threats, fractured politics and bitter history it confronts, Iraq's democratic government has accomplished much in two short years.

Interesting read. Iraq having a democratic government ... not sure about that, I think that itself could be the basis for a very interesting and lively debate on this forum.

I would agree that Iraq government has accomplished quite a lot in the last two years but let's not forget who made this possible and kept pushing the Iraqi government in the back when needed. I think the $64 question is where will Iraq be two years after the US has largely left the country? In my estimation, George Bush will either be vindicated or further (and justifiably) villified for what may be success or debacle .... depending on which way the pendulum of success/failure swings.

[switchfoot]

Originally Posted by KEVWYO

Interesting read. Iraq having a democratic government ... not sure about that, I think that itself could be the basis for a very interesting and lively debate on this forum.

I would agree that Iraq government has accomplished quite a lot in the last two years but let's not forget who made this possible and kept pushing the Iraqi government in the back when needed. I think the $64 question is where will Iraq be two years after the US has largely left the country? In my estimation, George Bush will either be vindicated or further (and justifiably) villified for what may be success or debacle .... depending on which way the pendulum of success/failure swings.

I agree whole-heartedly. I will know in person in Jun of '09, so I will let you all know, assuming I don't get my a$$ shot off!

[Powerman]

Originally Posted by ZenMachine

Some things that don't pass muster in this article. First is the reference to the battle of Karbala. It was not a battle between semitic Arab and Iranians. It was a battle between the grandson of Mohammed, Husayn ibn Ali, and the forces of Yazid, the caliph. The battle was over who should be caliph. The followers of Husayn ibn Ali were slaughtered and those who follow them came to be Shia Muslims and the followers of the caliph Sunni. Shia did not spread to Persia until after that time.

Second, the so-called de-baathification program was not a major piece of legislation but rather a huge mistake. Many people in Iraq that were instrumental to the country but not necessarily loyal to Saddam were in the Baath party. To be in any public position such as the better army units, the national government, police force, a teacher, doctor required that one be a member of the party. In the same way that Patton kept Nazis on in their previous posts after the fall of Germany, on the grounds that they were the only ones capable of effectively running the country, we should have sought to keep some Baath party members in government, especially the police and some army units.

The book State of Denial by Woodward chronicles the missed opportunities during the early days in Iraq. Gen. Garner had the chance to keep 100,000 non-conscript Iraqi troops as units of the new government for the bargain price of $20 million. This would obviously have been a buffer against the chaos that ensued in the loss of security after the fall of Baghdad. These troops had knowledge of how to maintain security in Iraq and instead of using them we decided to start fresh with Shia majority police and army units that still have not proven to be very effective. Of course many of those very same Sunni troops we could have kept on the payroll joined the Sunni insurgency no longer being employed by the Iraqi government.

Of course those absolutely loyal to Saddam, his family, and very high ranking members of rep. guard units needed to be taken out, but there were many other Sunnis that were not from Saddam's al-tikriti tribe that would have been willing to work for us. Ironically, this is basically what Petraeus has attempted to do with the "awakening" councils. So I would argue to that de-baathification was a resounding failure than a major piece of legislation as the author claims.

I am not sure if we could have prevented the slide into chaos had we kept some Sunni baath party members in the government, but we would have had a much better chance of doing so...

It seems you are talking of two different events. The U.S. criminalized the Bath party the first year we were there. As far as the Legislation the Iraqi government has worked on for de-Bathification, I'm not sure what impact that has had on casting them out or bringing them back in.

I do agree with you that Saddam loyalists had to be removed. However, Bath party members were not necessarily Saddam supporters.

[Powerman]

Originally Posted by switchfoot

Well stated. Hindsight is like that. Next time we invade Iraq, we should keep that in mind. I'm not sure what part of the OP you are refering to though...

Again, it was both. The two are not mutually exclusive. And hindsight, again, makes us all experts at invading countries.

I have never claimed to be an expert on invading countries. I would like to think Bush, Chenney, Rummy, Rice, and Bremer were more experts on the subject than they have been shown to be in 02.

Rummy had no intention to stay. We started with drawing troops immediately. Then Bremer criminalized Ba'ath Party members and fired all security forces. The right hand was not communicating to the left, and there was no plan for dealing with post-invasion Iraq.

That is not hindsight, thats gross incompetence. Even when we made the decision to invade, I was happy to see Saddam finally being dealt with, but it was obvious even back then we had no real plan other than going in guns blazing.

Now I'm no strategic genius like Bush and his expert administration, but if you would have told me in 03 the plan was to invade, remove Saddam, appoint an American leader, fire the Army, and remove Ba'ath Party members from position, and then withdraw our troops, I would have told you you were on crack if you thought that had any possibility of succeeding.

[KEVWYO]

Originally Posted by Powerman

Now I'm no strategic genius like Bush and his expert administration, but if you would have told me in 03 the plan was to invade, remove Saddam, appoint an American leader, fire the Army, and remove Ba'ath Party members from position, and then withdraw our troops, I would have told you you were on crack if you thought that had any possibility of succeeding.

Great .... now we find out George and Crew were on crack.

[AZXD]

Originally Posted by KEVWYO

Great .... now we find out George and Crew were on crack.